The impact of a firm’s make, pseudoâ  make, or buy strategy on product performance by Park, Jin‐kyu & Ro, Young K.
Journal of Operations Management 29 (2011) 289–304
The impact of a firm’s make, pseudo-make, or buy strategy on product
performance
Jin-Kyu Park a, Young K. Rob,∗
a College of Business Administration, Chung-Ang University, 221 Dongjak-gu, Seoul 156-756, South Korea
b College of Business, University of Michigan – Dearborn, 19000 Hubbard Dr., Dearborn, MI 48126, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 12 October 2009
Received in revised form 9 August 2010
Accepted 17 August 2010
Available online 24 August 2010
Keywords:
Modular/integral product architecture
Make/pseudo-make/buy sourcing strategy
U.S. bicycle industry
a b s t r a c t
The bulk of the product architecture and make-buy choice literature deals with product architecture
changes from integral to modular form. This development is often associated with a firm’s tendency
to change from a make to a buy strategy. However, a few studies investigate the change of product
architecture in the reverse direction – frommodular to integral form – and the subsequent change in the
firm sourcing decision from a buy to a make strategy. These studies hold to the presumption that a firm
following amake strategywill outperformfirms following a buy strategy in dealingwith integral product
architectures. Based on the knowledge-based view, we argue for the viability of a sourcing strategy
between the pure make and buy strategies – a pseudo-make strategy. We also argue that as product
architecture changes fromamodular to integral form, firms adopting this pseudo-make strategy are likely
to show better product performance than firms following a puremake or buy strategy due to the relative
knowledge advantages of the pseudo-make strategy in dealingwith the integral product architecture.We
examine the impact of themake/pseudo-make/buy strategies on product performance in the U.S. bicycle
derailleur and freewheel market from 1980 to 1992 and provide theoretical andmanagerial implications
of our results. Our findings highlight an important distinction between the pseudo-make and make-buy
strategies that has not previously been fully appreciated in the extant literature, and as a result increases
our understanding of why some firms do not switch strategies from a buy to a make strategy when
product architecture changes from modular to integral form as previously expected.
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
There has been growing interest in the relationship between
product architecture (PA) and a firm’s make or buy (M/B) strategy
over the last several years (Fine, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 2000;
Christensen et al., 2002). During this time, a substantial PA andM/B
literaturebodyhasdeveloped that indicates thatmanyproducts are
becoming increasingly modular over time, and that this develop-
ment is often associated with a firm’s tendency to change from a
make to a buy strategy (Sturgeon, 2002). A classic example of this
phenomenon is seen in thepersonal computer industry (Fine, 1998;
Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Before IBM opened up the PA of its per-
sonal computer, the architectural design of the personal computer
was integral in form and firms tended to pursue a make strategy
over a buy strategy. This was the state of the product and industry
in the personal computermarket for a few years – until Apple came
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along. In response to Apple’s challenge, IBM opened its modular PA
up to potential suppliers and many specialized firms entered the
market by adopting IBM’s modular PA. Even IBM’s rivals used the
modular PA in their PC clones. Shortly thereafter, IBM’smodular PA
became the standard in themarket. Once there existedmany capa-
ble specialized componentfirms in the PCmarket, the ‘buy’ strategy
proved to be more efficient than the ‘make’ strategy in dealing
with the modular PA. The more firms adopted the modular PA,
the greater the chance for specialized component firms to thrive.
Over time, these self-reinforcing complementarities between the
firms’ proclivities to use outside suppliers and the prevalence
of suppliers producing components within the framework of the
modular PA led more firms to change from a make to a buy
strategy.
Interestingly, the majority of relevant empirical research fol-
lows thedirectiondemonstrated in thepersonal computer industry
example – a PA change towards higher degrees of modularity and
the impact of this PA change on firms’ M/B choices (Sanchez and
Mahoney, 1996; Garud et al., 2002; Jacobides and Winter, 2005).
Although there exist industries that demonstrate a change of PA
from modular to integral form triggered by radical (or architec-
tural) innovations such as the disk drive (Christensen et al., 2002),
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PC (Fine, 1998), notebook computer (Hoetker, 2006), Swiss watch
(Jacobides and Winter, 2005), cell phone and HDTV industries,
much of the extant literature reflects an evolution of PA and firms’
M/B decisions in one predominant direction – that of the PA chang-
ing from integral to modular form and firms’ decisions to change
from a make to a buy strategy. Given that much of the previous
scholarlywork has dealt with primarily one evolutionary direction,
this study’s interest lies in the opposite direction.
1.2. Shortcomings in the literature
A few earlier studies suggest that when the architecture of a
product changes frommodular to integral form via radical or archi-
tectural innovation, firmsare likely topursueamake strategyover a
buy one (Fine, 1998; Christensen et al., 2002; Jacobides andWinter,
2005). Given that most of the existing research resides in one evo-
lutionary perspective, these small number of works are believed to
be meaningful. However, this study finds one limitation of these
earlier pieces. Most of them are based on anecdotal analysis, pre-
suming thatwhendealingwith integral PAs, afirm following amake
strategy performs better than a firm following a buy strategy.With
this presumption, some scholars jump to the conclusion that firms
are likely to change froma buy to amake strategy as the PA changes
frommodular to integral form. However, testing this presumption
empirically tends to be overlooked in earlier research. If somehow
firms following a buy strategy exhibit superior (or similar) perfor-
mance to firmswith amake strategy, then the firms pursuing a buy
strategy may not be strongly motivated to pursue a make strategy
in the face of a modular-to-integral PA change.
If true, this expectation would differ from the conclusion that
earlier studies of the make-buy strategy have suggested (Sanchez
and Mahoney, 1996; Fine, 1998; Christensen et al., 2002). There-
fore, without theoretically and empirically validating the impact of
a firm’s make-buy decision on performance, simply investigating
the relationship between PA and firm behavior regarding a firm’s
make-buy choice will not provide clear prescriptive or normative
managerial implications.Given the lackof theoretical andempirical
validation of the aforementioned presumption, the purpose of this
study is to validate this presumption and ask the research question,
“As PA changes frommodular to integral form, are firmswith a buy
strategy able to outperform firms with a make strategy in dealing
with the new integral PA?”
1.3. Purpose of study
Previous studies seem to ignore the possibility that a firm’s
knowledge and capability prior to a change of PA from modular to
integral formcould affect a firm’s performancewhendealingwith a
new integral PA (Nelson andWinter, 1982).When the dominant PA
inaparticular industry ismodular, firmsoftenpursueabuy strategy
(e.g. via outsourcing, alliance building) (Fine, 1998). However, firms
pursuing a buy strategy may readily possess different knowledge
capabilities. Somefirmsmayoutsource theentiredesignandmanu-
facturing functions tooutside supplierswhileothersmayoutsource
only the manufacturing function, keeping the design capability in-
house. This latter type of sourcing strategy, where the knowledge
capability is kept in-house (e.g. Brusoni et al., 2001), is described
as a ‘pseudo-make strategy’ and is essentially a type of hybrid buy
strategy with the knowledge advantages akin to the make strat-
egy combined with the functional outsourcing of the buy strategy.
Firms practicing a pseudo-make strategy may be reluctant to out-
source any knowledge-relevant design and development work to
external suppliers, assigning only the function of component pro-
duction to them. Given the possibility that a pseudo-make strategy
does exist, distinctive from either the make or buy strategy, our
overarching argument is that there is a strategy in between the
pure make and buy strategies – herewith called a pseudo-make
strategy – and that as PA changes from modular to integral form,
firms adopting this pseudo-make strategy are likely to show bet-
ter product performance than firms following a pure make or buy
strategydue to the relativeadvantagesof thepseudo-makestrategy
over the make or buy strategies in knowledge search, sharing, and
integration required in dealing successfully with the new integral
PA. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact
of themake/pseudo-make/buy (M/PM/B) strategiesonproductper-
formance in theU.S. bicycle derailleur/freewheelmarket from1980
to 1992. By doing so, this study provides valuable contributions to
the extant literature. The traditional dichotomous make and buy
sourcing strategies have been established in the transaction cost
economics (TCE) literature for quite some time. However, with this
M/PM/B categorization, our study finds that in dealing with inte-
gral PAs, even derailleur firms engaged in outsourcing activities can
offer product performance at a similar level to those of firms with
a make strategy, provided that commensurate knowledge on the
outsourced components remains in-house (i.e. the pseudo-make
strategy). This suggests that the presumption2 of existing works
may not always be true. We therefore highlight an important dis-
tinction between the pseudo-make and buy strategies that has not
previously been fully appreciated in the extant literature, and as
a result, increases our understanding of why some firms do not
switch strategies from a buy to a make strategy when PA changes
from modular to integral form as previously expected.
For the development of our overarching arguments, we draw on
the KBV (knowledge-based view) and firm/knowledge boundary
literature within the framework of the PA and M/B choice litera-
ture (Fine, 1998; Christensen et al., 2002). To explain why we are
using the KBV and firm/knowledge boundary literature, it should
be noted that this research specifically focuses on product perfor-
mance. When a PA is standardized and modular in form, rather
thancompeting for improvedproductperformance, firmswill often
compete over price/cost reductions or by conveniently customizing
product features and functions (Christensen et al., 2002). However,
whenaPAchanges to integral formvia radical or architectural inno-
vation and subsequently tilts the market towards the new integral
PA,firmsaremore likely to competebyproviding improvedproduct
performance in order to win competitive advantage (Christensen
et al., 2002). Therefore, looking into the impact of a firm’s strategy
on product performance is meaningful to this study. Given that our
major interest is on the impact of the M/PM/B decision on prod-
uct performance in dealing with integral PAs, we need a literature
base that sheds light on the relationship between PA change and
firm/knowledge boundary decisions and its effect on product per-
formance. Earlier research within the KBV literature emphasized
the importance of knowledge to create and sustain competitive
advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984;Barney, 1991). It explainedhoworga-
nizational governance choice – in particular, the advantages of a
make strategy – influences knowledge exchange and protection
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1996).
Nickerson and Zenger (2004) theoretically proposed a discrimi-
nating alignment between problem complexity (i.e. the degree of
interdependence among knowledge sets) and alternative organi-
zational arrangements (markets, authority-based hierarchy, and
consensus-based hierarchy) that vary according to their abilities
to mitigate knowledge formation hazards and to their impact on
product performance and solution search (Afuah, 2001; Macher,
2006). The firm/knowledge boundary literature also provides a
clear reason for theexistenceof apseudo-makestrategy, suggesting
that such a strategy provides unique firm advantages distinct from
2 The presumption that firms utilizing a make strategy are likely to exhibit supe-
rior performance to firms utilizing a buy strategy.
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the advantages of the pure make or buy strategies (Brusoni et al.,
2001; Dosi et al., 2003). The less-than-perfect overlap between the
knowledge and firm boundary has been corroborated via in-depth
industry case studies based on both qualitative and quantitative
evidence (Brusoni, 2005;Brusoni andPrencipe, 2006).We therefore
believe that both the KBV and firm/knowledge boundary literature
are directly relevant to the interest of this study and provide a rich
theoretical backdrop for the development of our arguments.
2. Theory and hypothesis development
2.1. Theoretical background
Product architecture (PA) is dynamic (Baldwin and Clark, 2000;
Shibata et al., 2005). As discussed earlier, a substantial literature
stream suggests that many products are becoming more mod-
ular over time and this development is often associated with a
firm’s tendency to pursue a buy strategy over a make strategy.
During the early stage of an industry, firms are unfamiliar with
customer needs and technology mechanisms, leading to misalign-
ments between desired product performance and customer needs.
Firmsmay need to experimentwith newproduct designs and tech-
nologies to satisfy customers, lending themselves to generate PAs
integral in form.However, once adominant design emerges and the
industry matures, firm competition revolves around refinements
of existing components within the dominant architecture. Once
many firms adopt the dominant design, the PA becomes modular
and standardized. Component linkages and associated knowledge
is disseminated and firms become more efficient by focusing on
specific components. In this environment, specialized component
firms can easily enter the market and firms may tend to use exter-
nal suppliers as the number of capable suppliers increases. The
availability of such suppliers is likely to tempt firms to use a buy
strategy and purchase components through outsourcing or alliance
arrangements.
In contrast to thePAevolutionexplainedabove, radical (or archi-
tectural) innovations often trigger the change of PA from modular
to integral form (Jacobides and Winter, 2005; Shibata et al., 2005).
While much of the extant literature shares the notion of increas-
ing productmodularity and the accompanying tendency of firms to
pursue a buy strategy, a fewmeaningful studies provide the possi-
bility of an opposite-direction evolution of PA andM/B choice (Fine,
1998; Christensen et al., 2002; Fixson and Park, 2008). This body of
opposite-directional studies suggest that as PA changes frommod-
ular to integral form, firms may prefer a make strategy over a buy
strategy with the presumption that firms adopting a make strategy
will outperform firms that adopt a buy strategy.
Given the lack of research validating the aforementioned
presumption, the theoretical and empirical validation of this pre-
sumption is of particular interest to this study. Specifically, in the
situation where PA changes frommodular to integral form via rad-
ical or architectural innovation, this study looks into the impact
of the M/PM/B choice on product performance in dealing with a
new integral PA. Differing from earlier studies, this study catego-
rizes a firm’s make or buy strategy into three separate strategies:
make, pseudo-make, and buy. Ourmain arguments revolve around
the relative advantages offered by a pseudo-make strategy in the
search, sharing, and integration of knowledge over amake or a buy
strategy.
Also, as mentioned earlier, this study focuses on product per-
formance. When the dominant PA in an industry is modular
and standardized, firms tend to compete on price/cost reductions
(Christensen et al., 2002), but the change of PA from modular to
integral form leads firms to compete on the basis of product perfor-
mance (Fine, 1998; Christensen et al., 2002; Jacobides and Winter,
2005). This was the case in the U.S. bicycle derailleur/freewheel
market both before and after index shifting technology was intro-
duced. Index shifting technology, an architectural innovation,
changed the PA of the bicycle driving-train set from modular to
integral form. It altered the basis of firm competition and enacted
tremendous product performance advantages over the traditional
technology. Index shifting technology was in such demand by cus-
tomers that bicycles without the technology did not sell well on
the market. Thus, bicycle makers rushed to adopt the technology
mainly to improve their product (shifting) performance (Fixsonand
Park, 2008). Given the change in the basis of competition, product
performance became a key factor in firm success. It is therefore
very meaningful to explore the impact of a firm’s M/PM/B choice
on product performance in the face of a modular-to-integral PA
change.
2.2. Make strategy vs. buy strategy
As PA changes from modular to integral form, a make strat-
egy is more likely to provide the knowledge advantages required
in dealing with the new integral PA than a buy strategy and
firms with a make strategy are more likely to show better prod-
uct performance than firms with a buy strategy. Modular PAs,
which permit components to be developed and produced sepa-
rately and to be used interchangeably (Baldwin and Clark, 2000),
do not require extensive systemic knowledge that encompasses
multiple knowledge sets regarding product components and archi-
tectures. They also do not necessitate a high degree of integration
of manufacturing systems since these types of PAs demand little
coordination among various component designs and manufac-
turing tasks. In dealing with a modular PA, the buy strategy
provides many advantages to firms. A firm can realize cost sav-
ings and product diversity advantages when pursuing the buy
strategy. A buy strategy allows individual firms and suppliers to
develop and exploit their specialized expertise (Hammond and
Miller, 1985). Component interchangeability increases competitive
market pressures, providing incentives for suppliers to increase
product quality (Alston and Gillespie, 1989), improve product fea-
tures, and decrease time to market (Christensen and Rosenbloom,
1995; Christensen, 1997). Although pursuing a make strategy has
its own merits in terms of promoting coordination among inter-
dependent tasks and facilitating knowledge sharing and transfer
(Demsetz, 1988;Monteverde, 1995;Kogut andZander, 1996), these
advantageous features are less needed when dealing with modu-
lar PAs since product configurations remain relatively unchanged
and components are standardized and interchangeable. Therefore,
firms using a buy strategy can thrive in markets driven by mod-
ular PAs to a greater degree than firms using a make strategy
(Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Baldwin and Clark, 2000).
However, when PA changes from modular to integral form, an
alternative situation occurs. In the integral PA context, the sys-
temic interconnectivity of components results in a situation where
a change in one component necessitates changes to other com-
ponents in the system. This requires firms to extensively evaluate
potential consequencesof various solutionapproaches (Gavetti and
Levinthal, 2000) to improve performance of the end product. The
significant connectivity between product components within inte-
gral PAs entails intensive communication and knowledge sharing
between the focal firms and suppliers if certain components are
outsourced. The increased interdependence between various com-
ponent designs and manufacturing tasks leads to the situation in
which suppliers’ components may need to be customized to fit
those made by the buying firms (Williamson, 1975, 1985). This
design interdependency leads to the situation in which significant
component coordination is necessary to facilitate the understand-
ing of complexity of integral PAs. Basically, integral PAs present
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relatively high-complexity problems for firms since they require
extensive knowledge sharing and exchange when making compo-
nent changes to optimize product performance.
Due to the need for extensive knowledge sharing and inte-
gration, a buy strategy yields many disadvantages for firms in
dealing with an integral PA. It limits firms’ administrative controls
and communication channels and constrains firms from embrac-
ing adaptive, sequential, and interrelated changes needed to cope
with the high component interdependence of integral PAs. A buy
strategy is inefficient due to its weak support of knowledge shar-
ing and limited protection against knowledge appropriation. For
integral PAs, firms that facilitate the free sharing of information
without risk of appropriation or accumulation and where disputes
between firms can be monitored and resolved in a timely matter
are required instead (Teece, 1992). A make strategy is compara-
tively advantaged in dealing with an integral PA as its firm-specific
languages, communication codes, and information channels, com-
bined with their low-powered incentives and dispute resolution
mechanisms, encourage knowledge sharing and promote coordi-
nation (Monteverde, 1995; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1996).
The formationof researchanddevelopmentgoals and thedefinition
of research agendas are also easier under a make strategy. These
repeatedly occur due to the interdependence of integral PAs imply-
ing that amake strategy better facilitates the dissemination of new
knowledge through the formation of firm-specific languages and
communication codes (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004).
Thus, there are comparative performance advantages of the
make strategy over the buy strategy in dealing with an integral PA.
A make strategy is better able to manage the extensive knowledge
interdependencies through superior knowledge sharing and inte-
gration. Due to the relative advantages of the make strategy over
the buy strategy in dealing with high-complexity problems, firms
adopting amake strategymay show superior product performance
to those that do not when dealing with an integral PA. The above
arguments lead to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. When dealing with an integral PA, firms pursuing
a make strategy are more likely to exhibit better product perfor-
mance than firms pursuing a buy strategy.
2.3. Psuedo-make strategy vs. buy strategy
In today’s hypercompetitive business environment, most com-
panies cannot design and manufacture their product without the
help of external organizations. Since cutting-edge knowledge nec-
essary for radical (architectural) innovation tends to be widely
dispersedacrossdifferentfirms, innovation in somehighlydynamic
industries appears only possible if a firm reaches beyond its
boundaries. This observation has led some scholars to suggest
that the locus of innovation might be found in a network of
alliances, especially in high-technology industries (Powell et al.,
1996; Rothaermel andDeeds, 2004). The increasing trendof knowl-
edge specialization for the design and production of products
creates difficulties for firms that depend purely on in-house knowl-
edge (Brusoni et al., 2001). For desirable performance of innovative
products, it is therefore critical for firms to gain and integrate exter-
nal knowledge.
A pseudo-make strategy is believed to have comparative knowl-
edge advantages over a buy strategy. A firm will often gain
knowledge by buying outsourced components fromahighly skilled
supplier. Such learningopportunitieswill bemost productivewhen
the firm also has strong relevant expertise because its internal
skills create an absorptive capacity that enables knowledge trans-
fer (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The pseudo-make strategy allows
a firm to maintain awareness of external technologies and new
knowledge created outside of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
It also allows for the firm to absorb new knowledge and apply it
quickly to design and development projects, enabling the creation
of newer products that incorporate modern technologies. Also, the
pseudo-make strategy yields strategic flexibility to the firm since
it allows a firm to integrate design and production activities or to
outsource them. Toyota is one example of a firm utilizing a suc-
cessful pseudo-make strategy. Given that the interdependence of
electronics andmechanical parts in automobiles is increasing, Toy-
ota chose to source electrical components both internally and from
Denso (its largest external supplier) in order to better understand
the technology and learn indirectly about competitors (Fine, 1998).
In fact, Toyota outsources the majority of the components of many
of its vehicles, yet maintains internal competency in the compo-
nents it outsources (Ro et al., 2007). This allowsToyota to learnwith
and from its supplierswithout ever transferring all core knowledge
and responsibility in any area to suppliers. Basically, the pseudo-
make strategy leaves room for new knowledge to be built upon the
existing internal knowledge stock of a firm and allows for product
and design improvement to satisfy customer demands. As a result,
the knowledge generation and integration opportunities existing
under a pseudo-make strategy can improve product performance,
and the mixing of various knowledge stocks increases a firm’s
design and production capabilities (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997)
and helps a firm maintain awareness of external technologies and
new knowledge. However, under a buy strategy, any new knowl-
edge gained from working with an external firm cannot be added
to any existing internal knowledge stock of a firm since the pure
buy strategy precludes such commensurate internal know-how.
AsPAchanges frommodular to integral formtriggeredby radical
innovations, the sharing and integration of new external and exist-
ing internal knowledge is critical. When considering the case of a
modular PA, since the end system can be decomposed into separate
independentmodules, extensive communication and coordination
between the firm and its supplier is not necessary in outsourc-
ing situations. But in the case of an integral PA, components are
tightly coupled, necessitating the need for coordinated design and
production processes to create optimal linkages between compo-
nents to ensure optimum product or system performance. When
considering the high degree of component connectivity existing
within integral PAs, optimal integration of a firm’s existing knowl-
edge and supplier’s external knowledge is key for desirable product
performance. In fact, integral PAs have been described as being
able to deliver higher functional performance than their modu-
lar architecture counterpart (Ulrich, 1995), implying that superior
product performance requires the design, manufacture, and inte-
gration of external and internal knowledge of components. With
a pseudo-make strategy, a firm is better able to identify appropri-
ate project partners and shun low-quality partners (Akerlof, 1970;
Brusoni et al., 2001) since they better understand the technological
linkages between components and retain design competence in-
house. This enables a firm to better assess a partner’s skills, judge
its willingness to perform, evaluate its ability to accept guidance,
and provide feedback through technological transactions. With a
pseudo-make strategy, since existing knowledge provides a foun-
dation for absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), the
outsourcing firm is able to communicate technical requirements
to its supplier partner on a regular basis to ensure and provide
instruction that the outsourced components are manufactured to
specifications. Since a firm with a pseudo-make strategy can more
critically evaluate a supplier partner’s capability level and its readi-
ness to perform required tasks, the firm is better able to integrate
any external/internal knowledge necessary to learn and under-
stand intertwined tasks involved in component development for
integral PAs (Mayer and Salomon, 2006). In contrast, in a pure
buy strategy situation, this tight coupling of components required
for superior product performance would be difficult to emulate
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since both the design and manufacturing knowledge would be
housed within the supplier partner, putting the outsourcing firm
at a knowledge coordination and integration disadvantage.
Given its relative strengths, firms engaging in a pseudo-make
strategy are more likely to be faced with opportunities to learn
valuable technical knowledge and integrate this learning in-house.
As a result, the pseudo-make strategy should provide better oppor-
tunities to gain and share knowledge than the pure buy strategy. As
explained by Takeishi (2002), while “the actual tasks of designing
and manufacturing components could be outsourced, the relevant
knowledge should be retained internally to gain higher quality
component design.” (p. 331). Ultimately, the pseudo-make strat-
egy should have a positive impact on a firm’s product performance.
This line of reasoning yields the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. When dealing with an integral product architec-
ture, firms pursuing a pseudo-make strategy are more likely to
exhibit better productperformance thanfirmspursuingabuy strat-
egy.
2.4. Make strategy vs. pseudo-make strategy
A pseudo-make strategy has comparative advantages over a
make strategy with regards to knowledge search and integration.
A firm that engages in a pseudo-make strategy has access to a
broader stock of relevant knowledge (Powell, Koput, and Smith-
Doerr, 1996) than a firm engaging purely in a make strategy. As
mentioned in the development of Hypothesis 2, up-to-date knowl-
edge needed for successful innovation tends to be spread out over
several different firms, and as a result, a firm desiring to pursue
innovative product development is greatly advantaged if the firm
extends its knowledge search beyond its boundaries (Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004). The pseudo-make strategy allows a firm to
access external knowledgevia strategic partnershipswithpotential
suppliers and integrates this knowledge into the in-house design
activities. This access to external knowledge coupledwith thefirm’s
internal knowledge and capability enlarges the absorptive capac-
ity of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and prevents the firm
from becoming dependent on internal technical knowledge stocks
(Lei et al., 1996). It allows the firm to innovate and develop a larger
set of high quality products in order to gain competitive advan-
tage in the marketplace. It is true that under market uncertainty, a
firm pursuing a make strategy can grow and improve its product
offerings by integrating valuable technical knowledge. But firms
under amake strategywould lose access to information and knowl-
edge from suppliers. And in the case of unforeseen innovations in
the business landscape, current capabilities of a firm can be ren-
dered obsolete (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992)
and updating these capabilities can be cost prohibitive in a make
strategy situation. Finally, a make strategy reduces a firm’s man-
ufacturing flexibility, lengthening design time and the ability to
introduce new products (Harrigan, 1984). Given the comparative
advantages of the pseudo-make strategy over the make strategy,
a firm with a pseudo-make strategy will be in a better position to
develop relationships with external sources in order to gain access
to new technical knowledge developed outside of the firm’s bound-
aries (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Due to the relative knowledge advantages of the pseudo-make
strategy over the make strategy, firms with a pseudo-make strat-
egy are likely to show better product performance than firms with
a make strategy in dealing with integral PAs. As mentioned pre-
viously, the change of PA from modular to integral form often
requires new technological knowledge outside the firm bound-
ary to be integrated with the firm’s internal knowledge. Both the
make and pseudo-make strategies require a certain degree ofman-
agerial and task coordination to integrate design and production
processes. But it is the pseudo-make strategy that allows room for
relevant external knowledge to be added to the equation. Under
the pseudo-make strategy, firms can enrich product performance
by internalizing current valuable technological knowledge. At the
same time, they can develop and maintain external sourcing rela-
tionships to gain access to new technical knowledge developed
beyond the firms’ boundaries (Powell et al., 1996; Rothaermel et al.,
2006). In contrast, the pure make strategy provides a much lower
degree of strategic freedom for product development and inno-
vation. The pure make strategy reduces a firm’s ability to access
new knowledge that could prove useful in designing and produc-
ing successful products. It would cause the firm to behave more
like a closed system and prevent it from strategically responding to
dynamic contingencies in the external environment. As a result, the
make strategy inadvertently leaves greater room for technological
obsolescence, lack of information sharing, and strategic inflexibil-
ity (Harrigan, 1984; Rothaermel et al., 2006) than the pseudo-make
strategy in the long run.
Based on the knowledge advantages provided by the pseudo-
make strategy and the potential dangers offered by a pure make
strategy, we conclude that the pseudo-make strategy is likely
to result in superior product performance. This is not unlike
Rothaermel et al.’s (2006) argument that managing an intelligent
hybrid of the make and buy strategies via a form of taper integra-
tion appears to improve a firm’s product success and competitive
performance. Ultimately, this line of reasoning yields the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. When dealing with an integral product architec-
ture, firms pursuing a pseudo-make strategy are more likely to
exhibit better product performance than firms pursuing a make
strategy.
3. Method
3.1. U.S. bicycle derailleur and freewheel market
The above hypotheses are tested by observing theU.S. derailleur
and freewheel market from 1980 to 1992. The derailleur and free-
wheel are two important components in the bicycle driving-train
set. Thederailleur is amechanismthatmoves thebicycle chain from
freewheel sprocket to freewheel sprocket during gear shifting on a
multi-speed bicycle. This study’s interest lies in the consequences
of firms’ M/PM/B decisions regarding freewheel components3 on
product performance.
Prior to 1985, when index shifting technology (an architectural
innovation) came to market, the architecture of the driving-train
set was standardized throughout the industry. A derailleur made
by one firm could be interchangeable with a freewheel made by
another (Bicycling, March, 1987, pp. 38–42). Then in 1985, index
shifting technology was introduced to the market and enabled
the chain to move precisely from freewheel to freewheel during
shifting, reducing rattling sounds as bicycle riders searched for
chain alignment (Bicycling, March, 1987, pp. 38–42). The new index
shifting technology was distinctively different from the normal
driving-train set. First, it required the use of indexed components,
even though they looked very similar to conventional components.
3 Thederailleurwas amuchmoreexpensive andcomplicated component than the
freewheel. While the freewheel was composed of at most 10 sub-components, the
derailleur consisted of anywhere from around 30 to 60 sub-components. Most bicy-
cle driving-train set firms made their derailleurs in-house and considered whether
they shouldmake in-house or purchase externally the freewheel components. Since
the derailleur was both complicated and expensive, it was extremely rare for free-
wheel or other component companies to make the derailleur in-house or to even
purchase a derailleur company via M&A.
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Second, proper index shifting technology required firms to under-
stand new PA knowledge regarding the derailleur and freewheel.
The linkage between the derailleur and freewheel – called the chain
gap – became extremely important in the new indexed shifting
technologyandwasnot significant for themore traditional andcon-
ventional driving-train sets (Fixson andPark, 2008). Understanding
how to optimize the size of this chain gapwas a critical part in pro-
vidingdesirable derailleur shiftingperformance. This optimal chain
gapwas contingent on the features of the derailleur and freewheel.
It was so sensitive that even a minor change in the derailleur could
easily requirea change in the freewheeldesign. Throughmuch trial-
and-error experimentation, it was possible to create an optimized
chain gap for optimal shifting performance. Once index shifting
technology came into the picture, the PA changed from modular
to integral form and the shifting performance was affected by not
only the derailleur and freewheel component themselves but also
the optimized chain gap linkage between the derailleur and the
freewheel. Given the fluctuation of PA caused by the index shifting
technology, the U.S. bicycle derailleur and freewheel market from
1980 to 1992 sets itself apart as an appropriate setting for testing
the study’s hypotheses.
3.2. Sample and data collection
In this study, the keydependent variables relate to thederailleur
shifting performance. Firms can pursue both modular and integral
PAs at the same time. While a firmmay pursue a make strategy for
one derailleur/freewheel model, the same firm could also pursue
an outsourcing strategy for another model. Therefore, character-
izing a whole firm as engaging in an integral or modular PA, or
characterizing a whole firm as pursuing a make, pseudo-make, or
buy strategy, could lead to an under/overestimation of test results
(Baldwin, 2007). To deal with this problem, this study uses individ-
ual derailleur/freewheel sets for each ‘new’ bicycle driving-train
model as a unit of analysis. More specifically, this study looks
into derailleur firms’ M/PM/B strategies regarding freewheels for
each new bicycle driving-train model. By taking this approach, the
unit of analysis becomes a singular bicycle derailleur/freewheel
set for each bicycle model. This prevents the under/overestimation
regarding a firm’s propensity to pursue a M/PM/B strategy.4
This study’s primary data sources for the new bicycle driving-
train setmodelswere garnered fromBicycling’s andBicycle Annual’s
performance databases. Both trade magazines tested the driving-
train sets of various bicycles every year between 1980 and 1992.
For each new model produced by 26 different derailleur firms,
the database provided each bicycle’s derailleur performance such
as ‘derailleur movement’ and ‘number of miss-shiftings’. The
data sources also specified model titles, component names, and
manufacturers of freewheels. The data included the performance
numbers of a total of 492 new bicycle driving-train sets.
In addition, all other information concerning a firm’s M/PM/B
decision, PA change, and other independent/instrumental variables
presented in this study is primarily based on Bicycling’s Super
Spec Database (SSD) and Bicycle Annual’s Buyer’s Guide (BG). How-
ever, SSD and BG did not specify the information mentioned above
between 1990 and 1992. But former technical editors of Bicycling
and Bicycle Annual provided additional data sets that were previ-
4 As a point of illustration, suppose a bicycle maker introduces several new prod-
ucts in a given year with 80% of those products made entirely in-house and the
remaining 20%of those productsmadewith outsourced component sets. Itwould be
inappropriate to evaluate the bicyclemaker’s make-buy strategy bymerely viewing
the characteristics of one individual product. We accommodate for this by look-
ing specifically at each derailleur firm’s M/PM/B decision regarding the freewheel
component for each single driving-train model, leaving the unit of analysis at the
individual product level.
ously used to create SSD and BG. Based on this additional data,
complete information was obtained for the period between 1980
and1992.Other literary archives suchas theProceedings of the Inter-
national Cycling History Conference, the book ‘Dancing Chain’, and
Sutherland’s Handbook for Bicycle Mechanics (6th edition) were also
very helpful in understanding market and technological changes.
Based on the archival data analyses, this study constructed
the history of each firm, portraying a complete picture of firms’
M/PM/B decisions, PA changes, and all other relevant independent
and instrumental variables. The history of each firm, technological
changes, and other variables were then reviewed by the indus-
try experts interviewed to assess accuracy and any necessary
corrections.5 Through the data collection and analysis process, this
study compiled an unusually thorough data set.
3.3. Measures
3.3.1. Dependent variables
Number of missed shiftings (SMOOTH) and derailleur movement
gap (DMG). The key dependent variable was product performance.
For product performance, we used two criteria recorded by the
Bicycling and Bicycle Annual trade magazines. The first one was the
number of missed shiftings (SMOOTH) during the test period. This
criterion was based on how many times riders missed gear shift-
ings during a certain trial duration. Since missed shiftings could
happen due to causes other than problems with the derailleur and
freewheel, Bicycling magazine had special test tools which could
control for missed shiftings stemming from other components,
reporting only the number of missed shiftings from the combi-
nation of the derailleur and freewheel components. Special test
machines repeatedly and randomly changed chains from freewheel
to freewheelwithina certain timeperiod.With these testmachines,
Bicycling and Bicycle Annual tested each bicycle driving-train set for
3h, recording SMOOTH. The other performance criterion dealt with
the derailleur movement gap (DMG). This is the lever movement
travel distance required for derailleur re-centering.6 Froma techni-
cal standpoint, the rear derailleur has to track the cogs very closely
so that the chain is forced onto the next gear, requiring minimal
play in the rear derailleur pivots and parallelogram. Without the
properDMGminimizing the lever travel distance, bicycle riders can
easily hear noisy friction between the freewheel and chain. Simply
put, minimizing any movement in the derailleur is fundamental
for crisp and proper shifting. Each derailleurwas run through all 16
shifts. After each shift, the tester adjusted the shift lever until the
jockey pulley was exactly centered under the freewheel sprocket.
The tester thenmeasured howmuch levermovementwas required
for this re-centering, which was recorded as the DMG. The shorter
the DMG, the better the shifting performance.
3.3.2. Independent variables
Make, pseudo-make, buy. There are twomajor independent vari-
ables in our study’s design. One is the firm’s decision regarding the
5 In addition to the archival data, several interviews were conducted with indus-
try experts mainly to review the history of the variables suggested in this study.
The informants interviewed included current and former employees of 15 firms
selected for this case study including CEOs, technical directors, marketing directors,
mid-level project managers, and engineers. Current and former technical editors of
bicycling-related magazines served as informants external to the firms and were
also interviewed.
6 Our seconddependent variable,DMG, shouldnotbe confusedwith the chaingap.
While the chain gap was simply the distance between the derailleur and freewheel,
DMG was the lever movement (travel) distance required for derailleur re-centering.
Proper DMG required the use of indexed components and required firms to acquire
the optimal chain gap. TheDMGwas not somuch an issue of design but depended on
whether firms used indexed components and how well they achieved the optimal
chain gap.
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M/PM/B decision. Bicycling’s Super Spec Database (SSD) and Bicycle
Annual’s Buyer’s Guide (BG) provided information regarding firms’
decisionson theM/PM/Bstrategies for eachdriving-train setmodel.
Based on this data, for each individual firm’s decision, we iden-
tified how a transaction to procure the freewheel was organized
in each new driving-train set. We classified the firm’s decision as
‘make’ if a firm made the freewheel in-house, as ‘pseudo-make’ if
a firm designed the freewheel in-house but outsourced the man-
ufacturing of the freewheel to a supplier partner, and as ‘buy’ if a
firm completely outsourced the freewheel to a partner. It should
be noted that a firm’s make-buy decision can be considered an
orderly categorical variable and therefore is coded as zero for a
buy decision, one for a pseudo-make decision, and two for a make
decision.
Product architecture (PA). The second independent variable is
PA. As explained earlier, while a traditional conventional driving-
train set did not require extensive interaction of components, a
driving-trainwith thenewer index shifting technologyneededhigh
coordination between components. Accordingly, if a driving-train
component set did not include index shifting technology, it would
entail a modular PA. If a driving-train component set included
index shifting technology, it would entail an integral architecture
between the derailleur and freewheel. Hence, if the PA is integral,
PA is coded as one, and if the PA is modular, PA is coded as zero.
3.3.3. Control variables
Derailleur age. The more experience a firm has in producing
a derailleur, the more familiar it becomes with the design and
production of the derailleur component and the sourcing arrange-
ments involved in dealing with the freewheel component from
freewheel suppliers. Derailleur Age was measured as the number
of years that a firm had produced the derailleur component.
Derailleur complexity. Of all the bicycle driving-train compo-
nents, the derailleur was the most critical for shifting and the
most complicated to the extent that it was sometimes compared
to the Intel chip within a PC. The complexity of the derailleur
could directly influence shifting performance. The most complex
derailleurs included three key features – a two spring-loaded pivot,
a slant parallelogram, and a Shimano-style cage geometry (Berto,
2005). These features became part of more complicated derailleur
designs as the component evolved over time. Thus, the derailleur
design complexity became directly influenced by the following:
(1) Whether it included two spring-loaded pivots. Before 1985,
most derailleurs used only one spring-loaded pivot. The two
spring-loaded pivots were later created to better improve
derailleur movement.
(2) Whether it included a slant parallelogram. Similar to the
two spring-loaded pivot, the slant parallelogram replaced the
traditional simple parallelogram design. Adding the slant par-
allelogram feature improved derailleur movement.
(3) Whether it included a Shimano-style cage geometry. In a simi-
lar evolution to the other two features, the Shimano-style cage
geometry replaced the older, traditional Campagnolo7-style
cage geometry in the late 1980s. The Shimano-style cage geom-
etry enhanced derailleurmovement butwasmore complicated
in its design.
We categorized derailleur complexity as ‘0’, if it included none of
the three. ‘1’, if it included only one of three. ‘2’, if it included two
of three, and ‘3’, if it included all three features.
7 A leading Italian bicycle component manufacturer. Until 1985, when Shimano
came to dominate the market with index shifting technology, Campagnolo was the
leading bicycle component manufacturer.
Derailleur/freewheel sales. Derailleur/freewheel sets that inher-
ently sold in greater quantitymay have better shifting performance
than derailleur/freewheel sets that did not sell well. We
captured Derailleur/Freewheel Sales by using the number of
derailleur/freewheel sets sold every year, calculated in the Super
Spec Database.
M/PM/B duration. This variable is defined as the number of years
that a firm has pursued its current M/PM/B strategy. The longer
the time period a firm follows a make strategy, the greater the
chance of the firm having better capability to deal with the make
strategy, potentially affecting product performance. Similarly, if
a firm keeps a pseudo-make strategy for a long time, they may
acquire or develop unique capabilities for knowledge search and
integration. And if a firm keeps a buy strategy for a long time, the
firm may acquire certain capabilities to efficiently deal with its
suppliers (Gulati, 1995) which could affect product performance
(Dyer, 1997). By capturing the effects of firm–supplier relation-
ships, in-house knowledge, and in-house production experience
levels (Leiblein et al., 2002), this control variable could potentially
capture the impact of changing M/PM/B strategies by a firm on
product performance.
Firm size. Firmsizemay confound the effects of firmboundaryon
afirm’s competitive advantage (D’Aveni andRavenscraft, 1994) and
may also provide firmswith advantages inmanaging R&Defforts or
innovative activities (Panzar and Willig, 1981; Cohen and Klepper,
1996). Larger firms may have greater access to complementary
technologies and downstream capabilities (e.g.marketing, finance)
that make R&D more productive (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). This
study captures size by using market share as a proxy and was cal-
culated in the Super Spec Database.
Firm innovation capabilities. A firm’s technological innova-
tion capabilities regarding the derailleur could affect product
performance (Hoetker, 2005, 2006). Therefore, firm innovation
capabilities needed to be considered and were measured by the
number of patents concerning the derailleur per year.
Firm age. Firm age may influence both a firm’s performance and
its choiceof aparticulargovernance form(Barnett, 1990;Amburgey
et al., 1993). Firmage ismeasured as the number of years that a firm
made the derailleur component. With regards to firm age, older
more experienced firms would probably exhibit superior product
performance.
Firm Dummies and Year Dummies. Our model also included two
sets of dummy variables. First, Firm Dummies for the 26 firms in
our sample were used to capture any unmeasured heterogeneity
across panels. Second, Year Dummies from 1980 to 1992 controlled
for unobserved factors that vary over time, capturing any overall
changes in impact on product performance due to new technology
introduction, legal issues, and the like.
3.3.4. Instrumental variables
As will be explained later in more detail, we used a two-
stage switching regression model (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003)
based on Heckman’s method (1979) to analyze the data. This
method incorporates the analysis of instrumental variables and
is a regression-based statistical design model that captures sev-
eral decision factors (i.e. make, pseudo-make, or buy decisions)
affectingproduct performance. The two-stage switching regression
model without instrumental variables often leads to very unsta-
ble and unreliable estimates of parameters. When employing the
two-stage switching regression model, scholars have voiced two
cautions. First, variables associated with legal issues, government
policy, or industry environmental changes that ‘all’ firms, whether
characterized by a make or a buy strategy, must face need to be
considered (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). Second, these vari-
ables should affect the firm governance mode choice but should
not directly affect product performance. As a result, they would be
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captured in the first-stage estimation and not enter directly into
the second-stage estimation. This study includes two instrumental
variables believed to satisfy these two concerns.
Number of freewheel suppliers. This measure accounts for the
effect that shifts in bargainingpowerdue to thenumber of available
suppliers will have on firms’ make or buy decisions (Williamson,
1985; Pisano, 1990). This measure was obtained by counting the
number of freewheel firms that supplied production of freewheels.
Market demand uncertainty. Around the year 1990, demand for
MTBs (mountain bicycles) significantly increased (Fixson and Park,
2008). The sales volatility for bicycle models could have a direct
impact on whether firms utilize outsourcing arrangements (Dess
and Beard, 1984). Following Levy (1985) and Leiblein et al. (2002),
the log of firm bicycle sales was regressed on a time trend. The
variance of error term was used as a measure of Market Demand
Uncertainty.
3.3.5. Analysis
Empirically testing the effect of M/PM/B decisions on product
performance is not a simple problem due to endogeneity (self-
selection) issues (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). Firms rarely
approach the make-buy decision as a mutually exclusive event
(Baldwin, 2007). The decision is often biased towards one direction
due to the past propensity of a firm to choose one particular course
of action. For example, firms choosing a make strategy may have
particular production capabilities that are unobservable in specific
statistical models. These capabilities could make the firms’ make
strategy a highly profitable and attractive choice. Contrastingly, if
firms followingabuystrategydecide to followamakestrategy, they
would initially be less profitable than firms that originally chose a
make strategy. As a result, a regression of performance on make-
buy strategies that does not allow for endogeneity may not clearly
answer the effect of M/PM/B choices on product performance, and
normative implications drawn from the regression may be incor-
rect (Leiblein et al., 2002). The use of interaction terms also leads
to biased estimations (Mayer and Nickerson, 2005), since the inter-
action terms are highly likely to be correlated with the original
terms (Greene, 2003). The now-accepted approach of correction for
such treatment effects is a two-stage switching regression model
(Heckman, 1979) permitting an integrative model that simultane-
ously captures firms’ M/PM/B decisions as well as the observed
and unobserved factors affecting product performance (for a more
detailed explanation, see Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003).
Thefirst of the two stages inHeckman’s (1979) regressionmodel
deals with firms’ sourcing strategy choices in the face of modular-
to-integral PA change. Here, the goal is to obtain the inverse Mills
ratio via a probitmodelwhichwill then be used in the second stage.
In the first stage, a probitmodel is estimated to specify the relation-
ship between PA and a firm’s decision on the M/PM/B strategies,
including the two instrumental variables. Here is the first-stage
selection model:
Strategyij = ˛0 + ˛1 × Product Architectureij
+˛2 × Derailleur Ageij + ˛3 × Derailleur Complexityij
+˛4 × Derailleur/Freewheel Salesij
+˛5 ×M/PM/BDurationij + ˛6 × FirmSizeij
+˛7 × Firm InnovationCapabilitiesij
+˛8 × FirmAgeij + ˛9 × No. of Freewheel Suppliersij
+˛10 ×Market DemandUncertainty+ εij (1)
where i represents the derailleur/freewheel sets, j the firm, εij the
random error term and Strategyij the index of an ordered probit
estimation. With respect to actual strategy choices, Strategyij =0 if
Strategyij ≤1, Strategyij =1 if1 ≤ Strategyij ≤2, and Strategyij =2
if Strategyij >2, where1 and2 are referred to as break points in
the ordered probit.
We then calculated the inverse Mills ratio, which was for
correcting endogenous self-correction. In the second stage, we
estimated our product performance model (2), which is of major
interest in this study. The performance model (2) did include the
inverse Mills ratio terms as regressors along with all the vari-
ables that jointly influenced performance and governance mode
choices in order to obtain unbiased estimates of coefficients for
all the variables. However, performance model (2) excluded the
two instrumental variables – No. of Freewheel Suppliers and Market
Demand Uncertainty, both of whichwere used in the first stage. The
inverse Mills ratio corrects for sample selection bias that may arise
from self-selection of the M/PM/B choice (Heckman, 1979). With-
out such a correlation, our coefficient estimates could be biased by
unobservable factors affecting both theM/PM/B choice andproduct
performance.
In the second stage, which is of main interest to this study,
we pooled the yearly product- and firm-level data and estimated
a single model in which dependent variables were defined as
SMOOTH andDMG; both product-levelmeasures.While the depen-
dent variables were at the product level, the independent variables
included not only product-level, but also firm-level variables. Pool-
ing repeated observations on the same firmswould therefore likely
violate the assumptions of observation independence, resulting in
temporal autocorrelation of the model’s residuals and rendering
OLS estimates inefficient (Klein and Kozlowski, 2000). To com-
pensate for non-independence, we concluded our analysis using
a firm-specific fixed-effects model. The final model took the form:
Product Performanceijk = ˇ0 + ˇ1 × Product Architectureijk
+ˇ2 × Derailleur Ageijk
+ˇ3 × Derailleur Complexityijk
+ˇ4 × Derailleur/Freewheel Salesijk
+ˇ5 ×M/PM/BDurationijk
+ˇ6 × FirmSizeijk
+ˇ7 × Firm InnovationCapabilitiesijk
+ˇ8 × FirmAgeijk
+ˇ9 × FirmDummies
+ˇ10 × Year Dummies
+ˇ11 ×Mills Ratiok + εijk (2)
where i represents the derailleur/freewheel sets, j the firm, k the
make, pseudo-make, or buy decision, Mills Ratio the inverse Mills
ratio for organizing decision k and εijk a random error term. While
PA, Derailleur Age, Derailleur Complexity, Derailleur/Freewheel Sales,
and M/PM/B Duration are product-level variables, Firm Size, Firm
Innovation Capabilities, and Firm Age, are firm-level variables.
In order to generate the final product performance model Eq.
(2), several stepswere incurred.We first carried out a standard OLS
regression test (see bothModel 1s in Tables 4 and 5).We presented
cluster estimates of standard error at the firm level to account for
the firm-level effects shown in both Model 1s of Tables 4 and 5 (to
be explained in Section 4). Note, as well, the extremely large dif-
ferences between the conventional OLS standard errors and the
robust (cluster) corrected values. The three- or four-fold differ-
ences in magnitude of standard deviation strongly suggested that
there were latent effects, at least at the firm level. At this point, it
remained tobeconsideredwhichapproach,fixedor randomeffects,
was preferred. Secondly, we then tested a generalized Hausman
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(1978) specification test for fixed vs. random effects, and the fixed-
effect model prevailed.8 We initially included εij, which was the
product and firm interaction error term, and Vj, whichwas the firm
error term. But since the fixed-effects model survived, we dropped
theVj term (Raudenbush andBryk, 2001). The results also indicated
that the firm-specific residual was likely to differ between firms
yet remain constant for multiple observations from the same firm
(Bowen and Wiersema, 1999; Greene, 2003). In order to embody
firm-level effects more specifically, not only did we add firm size,
firm innovation capabilities, and firm age, but we also added firm
dummies, which controlled for several constant firm-level factors.
We also added time dummies to account for some events that may
take place within a particular year (both Model 2s and Model 3s
in Tables 4 and 5). For example, some firms could have imple-
mented a new major quality improvement program in a certain
year which could lead to increases in product performance. We
finally tested our product performance model (2), which included
the inverseMills ratio stemming from the first-stage regression (1),
in the two-stage switching regression model (see both Model 4s in
Tables 4 and 5).
Since SMOOTH was a discrete counting variable and DMG was
a simple continuous variable, we needed two different statisti-
cal procedures. For SMOOTH, the dependent variable exhibited
overdispersion – with the variance significantly exceeding the
mean – and thus a negative binomial regressionwas preferred over
the more common Poisson model (Hausman et al., 1984). How-
ever, the assumption with a negative binomial model is that even
counts are independent, which was not the case in our study. In
order to deal with non-independence, as mentioned before, we
used fixed-effect negative binomial models via the XTNBREG pro-
cedure in STATA. Regarding DMG, we ran a fixed-effect LSDV (least
square dummy variables) model using the XTREG procedure in
STATA.
4. Results
Table 1 displays the summary statistics and correlation coeffi-
cients for the variables in our study. Table 2 provides the summary
statistics for all variables categorized by the firms’ M/PM/B strate-
gies. As shown, no correlation among the theoretical variables
was deemed large enough to pose estimation problems, although
the correlations among several of the control variables were
occasionally highwith only two exceeding 0.6. Such levels ofmulti-
collinearity amongexplanatoryvariables could result in lessprecise
parameter estimates (i.e. larger standard error) for the correlated
variables but should not bias parameter estimates (Greene, 2003;
Kennedy, 2003).
In order to account for any endogeneity issues, we employed
a two-stage switching regression model. Accordingly, we first
describe the estimation results of the first-stage selection model
basedonourEq. (1).We thenexplain the results of the second-stage
performance model based on Eq. (2).
8 For SMOOTH, a generalized Hausman (1978) specification test for fixed vs.
random effects produced a chi-squared value of 2,536.04. The critical value was
15.507. And for DMG, a chi-squared value was 3881.45 and the critical value
was 15.507. These would imply that the fixed effects model would be the pre-
ferred specification. Our initial model included εij , which was the product and
firm interaction error term, and Vj , which was the firm error term: Product
Performanceij =ˇ0 +ˇ1 ×Product Architectureij +ˇ2 ×Derailleur Ageij +ˇ3 ×Derailleur
Complexityij +ˇ4 ×Derailleur/Freewheel Salesij +ˇ5 ×M/PM/B Durationij +ˇ6 × Firm
Sizeij +ˇ7 × Firm Innovation Capabilitiesij +ˇ8 × Firm Ageij +Vj + εij . However, when
we calculated the Hausman statistic using the two-level hierarchical estimates (i.e.
including the εij and Vj terms), the statistics for SMOOTH and DMG remained larger
than the critical value. As it was that the fixed effects model survived, we dropped
the Vj term. T
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Table 2
Summary statistics for buy, pseudo-make, and make strategies.
Buy (n=280) Pseudo-make (n=110) Make (n=102)
Mean S.D. Max Min Mean S.D. Max Min Mean S.D. Max Min
SMOOTH 3.829 1.183 6.000 2.000 3.316 1.082 5.000 2.000 3.304 0.825 5.000 3.000
DMZ 8.649 1.285 10.00 7.000 7.429 1.361 9.000 6.000 7.337 1.119 9.000 7.000
Product Architecture (PA) 0.583 0.124 1.000 0.000 0.627 0.275 1.000 0.000 0.758 0.175 1.000 0.000
Derailleur Age 13.82 11.82 70.00 1.000 14.91 12.38 70.00 1.000 8.430 12.92 70.00 1.000
Derailleur Complexity 1.520 0.141 3.000 0.000 2.563 1.510 3.000 0.000 2.664 1.460 3.000 0.000
Derailleur/Freewheel Sales 0.021 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.108 0.015 0.201 0.001 0.121 0.104 0.269 0.001
Duration of Buy, PM, and Make 4.889 3.240 12.00 1.000 7.183 2.577 12.00 1.000 6.458 1.587 12.00 1.000
Firm size 0.111 0.178 0.314 0.001 0.175 0.202 0.581 0.001 0.264 0.411 0.821 0.001
Firm Innovation Cap. 2.562 0.123 4.000 2.000 0.678 0.102 2.000 0.000 2.298 1.052 4.000 2.000
Firm Age 15.45 15.92 70.00 1.000 18.72 6.921 70.00 1.000 19.93 17.67 70.00 1.000
No. of Freewheel Suppliers 38.00 8.862 42.00 16.00 35.00 6.541 42.00 16.00 28.00 5.281 42.00 16.00
Market Uncertainty 0.023 0.003 0.032 0.012 0.033 0.011 0.045 0.008 0.042 0.018 0.063 0.002
4.1. First-stage selection results
The first-stage selection model relates to the firms’ decisions
on the M/PM/B strategies in dealing with integral PAs. Model 1 in
Table 3 is a baseline model and does not include the PA variable.
Model 2 includes the PA variable. Model 3 incorporates the two
instrumental variables – Number of Freewheel Suppliers and Mar-
ket Demand Uncertainty. While Model 2 is not an improvement
in fit over Model 1 (2 (1) = 2.15, p>0.1), Model 3 represents an
improvement in fit over Model 1 (2 (3) = 78.29, p<0.01).
The results regarding the coefficients ofPA inModels 2 and3also
proved to be positively significant (p<0.01). This would indicate
that the firms in our study exhibited a strong tendency to pursue
a make strategy over a buy or pseudo-make strategy when dealing
with an integral PA; an anticipated outcome based on the litera-
ture (Williamson, 1985; Fine, 1998; Christensen et al., 2002). We
also tested for the combination of the buy and pseudo-make strate-
gies and found that the significance of the test results turned out
Table 3
First-stage estimation results.
Make, pseudo-make, buy choice Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
PA (Product Architecture) +0.621*** +0.682***
(0.208) (0.213)
Derailleur Age −0.161 +0.290 +0.272
(0.212) (0.193) (0.171)
Derailleur Complexity +0.292*** +0.398** +0.383**
(0.061) (0.167) (0.173)
Derailleur/Freewheel Sales +0.409 +0.632 +0.668
(0.365) (0.536) (0.524)
Duration of make, PM, and buy +0.545 −3.310 +2.694
(0.353) (5.631) (5.382)
Firm size 2.964*** +1.510* +3.537**
(0.755) (0.669) (1.414)
Firm Innovation Cap. +1.159*** +0.118*** +0.102***
(0.079) (0.008) (0.014)
Firm Age −0.033 −0.113*** −0.014**
(0.117) (0.011) (0.007)
No. of Freewheel Suppliers −0.162***
(0.009)
Market Demand Uncertainty +0.205**
(0.101)
Constant −3.430** −3.899** −3.185***
(1.559) (1.854) (0.968)
N 492 492 492
Log L −258.24 −256.81 −198.27
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.36 0.51
Dependent variable (Zi) equals 0 for firms with a buy strategy, 1 for firms with a
pseudo-make strategy, and 2 for firms with a make strategy.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
to be the same.9 This indicated that firms showed a strong ten-
dency to pursue a make strategy over a buy strategy when dealing
with an integral PA. One could also argue that the strategy choice of
firms does not have to be specifically ordered and a firm pursuing
a buy strategy could immediately pursue a make strategy in lieu
of the pseudo-make strategy. In other words, firms can choose one
of the three strategies without having to “pass through” another.
With this inmind, we changed the strategy order coding and coded
0 for the pseudo-make strategy, 1 for the buy strategy, and 2 for
the make strategy. Upon testing, the same significant results were
obtained.10 It should be noted thatwe included the two instrumen-
tal variables, Number of Freewheel Suppliers and Market Demand
Uncertainty, at this stage but excluded them at the second stage
when dealing with the self-selection issue.
4.2. Second-stage performance results
Models 1–3 in Tables 4 and 5 show whether the independent
variable PA directly influences product performance. We begin
by running a simple OLS regression, providing both OLS standard
errors and the robust (cluster) corrected values in Model 1 of
both Tables 4 and 5. The three- or four-fold magnitude difference
between the two error values in Model 1 in Tables 4 and 5 strongly
indicates that there are invisible effects, at least at the firm level.
This suggests that using OLS to estimate panel data can result in
biased estimates because of unobserved heterogeneity. To correct
for this bias, either fixed- or random-effects models can be used.
We therefore performed a Hausman (1978) test to check which
model proved better for the analysis, and the fixed-effects model
prevailed. Both Models 2 and 3 in Tables 4 and 5 are fixed-effect
models, but while Model 2 does not include dummy variables,
Model 3 does include them. A comparison of Models 2 and 3 in
Tables 4 and 5 demonstrate the importance of firm effects. Intro-
ducing a firm dummy variable for each firm into the regression
substantially increased the log likelihood function, and theR2 of the
model rose from 0.391 to 0.759 in Table 4 and from 0.409 to 0.636
in Table 5.11 Notice that including firm dummies in the regression
results in rather large changes to the coefficients of the control
variables, confirming that some important determinants of product
performance are not being captured in Model 2 of Tables 4 and 5.
The firm dummies served to capture a variety of firm-level effects
such as the process capabilities of the firm, a factorwhich could not
be accounted for by Firm Innovation Capabilities alone.
Product Architecture (PA) in both Model 3s of Tables 4 and 5 was
negatively significant (p <0.05), indicating that firms that adopted
9 Results are available upon request.
10 Results are available upon request.
11 Including or excluding Year Dummy in themodels did not significantly affect R2 .
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Table 4
Second-stage estimation results (number of missed shiftings (SMOOTH) results).
(SMOOTH) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS Fixed-effect without firm
dummies
Fixed-effect with firm
dummies
Fixed-effect with firm dummies
and mills ratio
Estimate Std. err.a Buy Pseudo-make Make
PA (Product Architecture) −0.012** 0.005 −0.175* −0.247** − 0.081* −1.575*** −1.665***
(0.029) (0.102) (0.101) (0.248) (0.161) (0.551)
Derailleur Age +0.018 0.013 −0.004 + 0.005* −0.082 + 0.064 + 0.623
(0.051) (0.013) (0.003) (0.128) (0.166) (0.504)
Derailleur Complexity −0.237*** 0.031 −0.026* −0.028** −2.061*** −1.825*** −2.217***
(0.182) (0.014) (0.012) (0.078) (0.094) (0.268)
Derailleur/Freewheel Sales +0.020 0.037 + 0.018 + 0.004 − 0.030 − 0.276*** −1.283***
(0.059) (0.015) (0.004) (0.058) (0.054) (0.202)
Duration of make, PM, and buy +0.014** 0.007 −0.027* + 0.022* + 0.161*** −0.314*** −0.109***
(0.037) (0.015) (0.012) (0.007) (0.081) (0.016)
Firm size −0.067 0.052 −0.297*** −0.149*** −0.183 −0.251* −0.525*
(0.258) (0.024) (0.012) (0.187) (0.132) (0.297)
Firm Innovation Cap. −0.093** 0.039 −0.007* −0.034* + 0.249 −0.546*** −1.834***
(0.151) (0.004) (0.018) (0.159) (0.121) (0.179)
Firm Age −0.016 0.030 + 0.108 −0.028 −0.093 −0.154 −0.066
(0.250) (0.103) (0.103) (0.118) (0.125) (0.176)
Firm Dummy (26) 15 Firm*** 12 Firm*** 14 Firm*** 16 Firm***
Year Dummy (12) 1 year*** 1 year*** 1 year*** 1 year*** 1 year***
Inverse Mills ratio – buy −0.446
(0.359)
Inverse Mills ratio – pseudo-make + 0.773*
(0.421)
Inverse Mills ratio – make −0.472
(0.782)
Constant 4.158*** 0.015 2.178*** 4.143*** 8.125*** 13.193*** 11.211***
(0.071) (0.131) (0.101) (0.424) (0.601) (2.262)
N 492 492 492 280 110 102
Log L −1829 −1659 −924
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.391 0.759 0.698 0.743 0.781
Dependent variable is No. of missed shiftings (SMOOTH).
a Robust (cluster) standard error in parentheses.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
integral PAsweremore likely toexhibit betterproductperformance
thanfirms that didnot. Since index shifting technology significantly
improved shifting performance, performance gaps between con-
ventional and index shifting systems were large and bikes without
index technologydidnot sellwell (Bicycling,March1987, p. 38).Not
surprisingly, firms adopting the integral PA embodying index shift-
ing technology were likely to show better product performance.
Model 4 of Tables 4 and 5 is relevant to the interac-
tion effect between PA choice and the make/pseudo-make/buy
decision on product performance, which is of major inter-
est to this study. The coefficient estimate comparisons in
Tables 4 and 5 indicate the impact of ‘only’ integral PAs on
product performance for the M/PM/B strategies. To complement
the unidirectional analysis of Tables 4 and 5, this study adds
Figs. 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 2(b), 3(a) and 3(b). (a) in Figs. 1–3 is relevant to
SMOOTH, and (b) in Figs. 1–3 is relevant toDMG. These figures focus
on the performance comparisons of the three strategies for integral
andmodular PAs (Aiken andWest, 1991). By holding all variables at
their respective means and varying types of PAs, they compare the
product performances of firms with the M/PM/B strategies when
dealing with a modular or integral PA.
Model4alsoadds the inverseMills ratio (Lambda,). The inverse
Mills ratios given in Model 4 of Table 4 for the pseudo-make strat-
egy are significant, interpreted as the unobserved characteristics
of the pseudo-make strategy influencing product performance rel-
ative to the other strategies. However, the inverse Mills ratios in
the buy and make strategies are not significant. This may suggest
that the impact of unobserved characteristics of firmswith a buy or
make strategy on product performance is negligible. Regarding the
inverse Mills ratios in Model 4 of Table 5, the inverse Mills ratios
for the buy and pseudo-make strategy are significant, denoting that
unobserved characteristics of the buy and pseudo-make strategy
influence product performance. However, the inverse Mills ratio
for the make strategy is not significant, indicating that unobserved
characteristics of the make strategy negligibly influence product
performance.
Comparing the R2 of Models 2 and 3, we see that adding
firm dummy variables explains a substantial improvement of the
R2. However, adding the inverse Mills ratios does not appear to
improve the R2 in Model 4 of Tables 4 and 5. This reflects the fact
that the firm dummy variables and the inverseMills ratiosmay not
be orthogonal. These ratios represent unobserved characteristics of
a firm’s M/PM/B strategy, and the unobserved characteristics may
already be embodied by the firm dummy variables representing
any unobserved organizational factors. In fact, though individual
correlation coefficients between the firm dummy variables and the
inverse Mills ratios are not particularly high, the two sets of vari-
ables may essentially span the same space causing the addition of
the inverse Mills ratios to not improve the R2 significantly.
Regarding the interaction coefficients between the PA and the
M/PM/B strategy choice in Model 4 of Tables 4 and 5, we first com-
pare the PA coefficients of the buy andmake strategies. Notice that
the PA coefficients inModel 3 of Tables 4 and5 are negatively signif-
icant (both p<0.05). However, the PA coefficient of the buy strategy
inModel 4 becomes less significant than the PA coefficient inModel
3 of Table 4 (−0.081, p<0.1).Moreover, the PA coefficient of the buy
strategy inModel 4 of Table 5 is not significant evenwith a positive
sign (+0.479). These results suggest that for product performance
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Table 5
Second-stage estimation results (derailleur movement gap (DMG) results).
(DMG) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
OLS Fixed-effect without firm
dummies
Fixed-effect with firm
dummies
Fixed-effect with firm dummies
and mills ratio
Estimate Std. err.a Buy Pseudo-make Make
PA (Product Architecture) −0.027** 0.011 −0.772** −0.823** +0.479 −2.946*** −2.744***
(0.047) (0.351) (0.375) (0.209) (0.131) (0.531)
Derailleur Age −0.036** 0.015 −0.126** −0.022 −0.009 +0.005 −0.095
(0.051) (0.050) (0.069) (0.100) (0.138) (0.311)
Derailleur Complexity −0.312 0.212 −0.105** +0.214** −0.167* −0.132* −0.430*
(0.034) (0.048) (0.101) (0.088) (0.070) (0.227)
Derailleur/Freewheel Sales + 0.077*** 0.012 +0.033* −0.009 −0.091* −0.055*** −0.096***
(0.041) (0.019) (0.026) (0.052) (0.032) (0.138)
Duration of make, PM, and buy −0.037** 0.016 −0.026** −0.002* +0.265*** −0.346*** −0.399***
(0.068) (0.011) (0.001) (0.081) (0.051) (0.108)
Firm size −0.002 0.001 −0.149*** −0.004** −3.989*** −0.267** −2.245***
(0.002) (0.019) (0.002) (0.187) (0.119) (0.231)
Firm Innovation Cap. + 0.036* 0.019 −0.087* −0.161** −0.891** −1.136*** −0.440**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.067) (0.401) (0.260) (0.173)
Firm Age + 0.018 0.013 +0.075 −0.042* −0.798* −0.166 −0.076
(0.061) (0.121) (0.022) (0.448) (0.227) (0.117)
Firm Dummy (26) 13 Firm*** 10 Firm*** 13 Firm*** 13Firm***
Year Dummy (12) 1 year *** 1 year *** 1 year ** 1 year ** 1 year **
Inverse Mills ratio – buy −0.403***
(0.101)
Inverse Mills ratio – pseudo-make −0.519**
(0.206)
Inverse Mills ratio – make 0.323
(0.618)
Constant 8.926*** 0.025 9.356*** 9.249*** 22.577*** 15.207*** 16.068***
(0.214) (0.244) (0.368) (0.787) (2.070) (1.678)
N 492 492 492 280 110 102
Log L −1623 −1581 −745
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.409 0.636 0.556 0.601 0.681
Dependent variable is derailleur movement gap (DMG).
a Robust (cluster) standard error in parentheses.
* p<0.1.
** p<0.05.
*** p<0.01.
improvement, it is not enough to just adopt the new technology,
but to also adopt the appropriate make-buy strategy correspond-
ing to the new technology. In this study, the buy strategy would
prove to be problematic in dealing with the new index shifting
technology and its integral PA, causing deterioration of product
performance. Firms with a buy strategy would find it difficult to
acquire and share the technical knowledge to efficiently deal with
the innate complexities of index shifting technology.
Contrastingly, PA is significantly negative for firms with a make
strategy (−1.665 and −2.744 in Tables 4 and 5, respectively,
p<0.01), a significant improvement from the PA coefficients of both
Model 3s in Tables 4 and 5. This suggests that firms which adopted
index shifting technology could improve shifting performance by
choosing a make strategy. In dealing with index shifting technol-
ogy, firms with a make strategy may be in a better position for
knowledge sharing and coordination so as to improve shifting per-
formance. Clearly, the results regarding themake vs. buy strategies
suggest that when dealing with an integral PA, firms following a
make strategy are likely to show better product performance than
firms following a buy strategy. When considering Fig. 1(a) and (b)
Fig. 1. (a) Interaction effect b/w PA and buy vs. make on SMOOTH. (b) Interaction effect b/w PA and buy vs. make on DMG.
J.-K. Park, Y.K. Ro / Journal of Operations Management 29 (2011) 289–304 301
Fig. 2. (a) Interaction effect b/w PA and buy vs. pseudo-make on SMOOTH. (b) Interaction effect b/w PA and buy vs. pseudo-make on DMG.
(in addition to Tables 4 and 5), and focusing on the product perfor-
mance comparisons of the three (M/PM/B) strategies for an integral
and modular PA, we find that in dealing with an integral PA, firms
pursuing a make strategy show better SMOOTH performance than
firms with a buy strategy by 43%, and better DMG performance by
37%. This suggests that when dealing with an integral PA, firms
adopting a make strategy displayed superior product performance
to firms adopting a buy strategy. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is strongly
supported in this test. However, in dealing with a modular PA, the
performance gap between firmswith a buy strategy and thosewith
amake strategy is negligible.When dominant PAs are standardized
and modular, the prevailing competitive concepts for firms tend
to focus on component diversification and cost reduction rather
than on providing better product performance (Christensen et al.,
2002). However, index shifting technology caused the dominant PA
to switch from modular to integral form, and this change created
unforeseen challenges for firms with a buy strategy to overcome
compared to firms that chose to follow a make strategy (in terms
of decreasing SMOOTH and DMG).
Notably, the coefficients of the pseudo-make strategy model
in Tables 4 and 5 are negatively significant (−1.665 and −2.744
in Tables 4 and 5, respectively, with p<0.01 for both). The level
of significance is greater than the PA coefficients in Model 3 of
Tables 4 and 5 (−0.247 and −0.823, respectively, with p<0.05
for both). These results suggest that firms could have improved
productperformance toagreater extentbypursuingbothapseudo-
make strategy along with adopting the index shifting technology
as opposed to just simply adopting index shifting technology alone
based on the integral PA. And as mentioned before, the PA coeffi-
cient of the buy strategy model in Table 4 is negatively significant
(−0.081, p<0.1) and not significant but positive (+0.479) in Table 5.
Juxtaposing the coefficients of PA between the pseudo-make and
buy strategies would indicate that in the integral PA context, firms
pursuing thepseudo-make strategywouldexhibit superiorproduct
performance to firms pursuing the buy strategy. The pseudo-make
strategy might be better in facilitating knowledge sharing and cre-
ating a single communication code (Monteverde, 1995) than the
buy strategy so that firms with a pseudo-make strategy can more
efficiently deal with complexity issues of index shifting technology
than firms with a buy strategy. Although both the buy and pseudo-
make strategies use an outsourcing approach, the results of this
study indicate that the implications for product performance are
quite distinct between the two strategies. Moreover, as in Fig. 2(a)
and (b), in dealing with an integral PA, firms with a pseudo-make
strategy clearly outperformed firms with a buy strategy by 42%
and 37% in terms of SMOOTH and DMG, respectively. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2 is also strongly supported. However, similar to the
case between the make and buy strategies, when dealing with a
modular PA, firms with a buy strategy did not show significant
product performance differences from firms with a pseudo-make
strategy. This is again believed to stem from firms competing for
cost reductions or component diversity rather than on improved
product performancewhen dealingwith amodular PA (Fine, 1998;
Christensen et al., 2002).
Lastly, comparing the impact of the make and pseudo-make
strategies onproduct performance,Model 4 in Tables 4 and5 shows
Fig. 3. (a) Interaction effect b/w PA and make vs. pseudo-make on SMOOTH. (b) Interaction effect b/w PA and make vs. pseudo-make on DMG.
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that firms utilizing the make strategy seemed to exhibit similar
product performance to firms utilizing a pseudo-make strategy
with both coefficients being negatively significant (p<0.01). In
addition, a comparison of product performance between the make
and pseudo-make strategies in Fig. 3(a) and (b) shows that the dif-
ferenceofproductperformancebetween the twostrategies seemed
negligible when dealing with both integral and modular PAs. In
dealing with the integral PA, in terms of SMOOTH, firms with a
make strategy seemed to slightly outperform firms with a pseudo-
make strategy; in terms ofDMG, firmswith a pseudo-make strategy
seemed to slightly outperformfirmswith amake strategy. But both
cases did not show any statistically significant performance gaps.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not strongly supported. However, this
finding is still very meaningful since it suggests that when deal-
ing with an integral PA, firms adopting a pseudo-make strategy
could yield similar product performance to firms adopting a pure
make strategy. The findings of this study indicate that even if a firm
uses a buy strategy, if it can keep design capability (or requisite
design knowledge) in-house (i.e. the pseudo-make strategy), the
firm could yield product performance on a similar level to that of
firms following a make strategy.
5. Discussion and implications
As stated in Section 1, most of the relevant PA and M/B choice
literature focuses on one predominant evolutionary direction – the
integral-to-modular PA change. However, a few studies reside in
the opposite evolutionary direction and suggest that as PA changes
from modular to integral form, firms are likely to change their
strategy from a buy to a make strategy. These works are based
on the presumption that in dealing with an integral PA, firms with
a make strategy are likely to outperform those with a buy strat-
egy. Given the lack of empirical testing, the purpose of this study
is to theoretically and empirically validates this presumption by
exploring the U.S. bicycle derailleur/freewheel market from 1980
to 1992. Prior to index shifting technology, the PA of the derailleur
and freewheel was modular and standardized in form. Competi-
tion betweenfirms resided in cost reduction efforts and component
diversity development rather than product innovation or superior
product performance (Fixson and Park, 2008). In truth, the bicycle
derailleur and freewheel market also showed that under the mod-
ular PA paradigm, product performance (as measured by SMOOTH
and DMG) was not significant between different strategies. How-
ever, once index shifting technology was introduced in 1985, the
new technology shifted the dominant PA in the market frommod-
ular to integral form and the concept of competition changed to
from cost reduction to product performance. As a result of the
shift, optimally designing the chain gap (i.e. the linkages between
the derailleur and freewheel) became quite complex and critical
for desirable shifting performance, an issue not of great concern in
the older conventional driving-train sets (Fixson and Park, 2008).
Given the occurrence of a significant PA shift frommodular to inte-
gral form, this study empirically tested the product performance of
firms with different M/PM/B strategies.
5.1. Theoretical and managerial contribution
This study provides several valuable contributions to both aca-
demics and practitioners alike. Regarding academic contributions,
this study first provides empirical evidence for the relationship
between PA and M/PM/B strategic choices and their impact on
product performance in the face of an integral PA. Despite the
general acceptance of the theoretical models, little empirical evi-
dence exists to establish a wide industry base of support for them.
The rigorous testing provided in this study can prove valuable in
establishing a basis of some empirical evidence to the current lit-
erature.
Second, this study bridges theories from the KBV and
firm/knowledge boundary literature with the PA and M/B choice
literature. By doing so, this study provides a more clear under-
standing of different sourcing strategies firms can pursue in the
face of modular-to-integral PA change in a manner that no one
literature body can do in isolation. By integrating the KBV and
firm/knowledgeboundary literaturewith thePAandM/B literature,
this study highlights a distinction between the buy, pseudo-make,
and make strategies that has not been fully appreciated. The main
thrust of our study is that there is a type of outsourcing strategy
in between the pure buy and make strategies – the pseudo-make
strategy (a hybrid strategy where the manufacturing function is
outsourced but the knowledge capability is kept in-house) – that
allows firms to capitalize on gaining and share knowledge deal-
ing with high-complexity integral PAs (due to the high component
interdependence). As explained earlier, much of the existing litera-
ture (Fine, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Christensen et al., 2002)
categorizes firms into two typologies: those that pursue a make
strategy and those that pursue a buy strategy. This dichotomous
categorization of sourcing strategies has been well established in
the literature for quite some time (e.g. TCE). With their emphasis
on the dichotomous choice between make and buy, earlier schol-
arly works presume that when dealing with an integral PA, firms
pursuing a make strategy are likely to outperform firms following
a buy strategy. However, with the make/pseudo-make/buy cat-
egorization, we found that derailleur firms with a pseudo-make
strategy in the bicycle industry showed significantly better prod-
uct performance than firms with a buy strategy, and firms with
a pseudo-make strategy showed similar product performance to
firms with a make strategy. These results suggest that even firms
engaged in outsourcing activities can offer product performance at
a similar level to those firms with a make strategy, provided that
proper knowledge integration and task coordination mechanisms
are in placewhile keeping design capability in-house. Our findings,
thus, imply that the presumption of the previous works might be
somewhat overly simplified.
Since the presumption might not always be true, this study
accordingly places a question mark on the suggestion of the ear-
lier works that as PA changes frommodular to integral form, firms
will likely pursue a make strategy over a buy strategy. The findings
highlight an important distinction between the pseudo-make and
buy strategies that has not previously been fully appreciated and
as a result increases our understanding of why some firms do not
switch strategies when PA changes frommodular to integral form.
As a case in point, Hoetker (2006) investigated the relationship
betweenPA change and thefirmboundary decision in thenotebook
computer industry. He studied themake-buy decision amongnote-
book computermanufacturers when dealingwith an integrated PA
andcategorizedfirmsaspursuingeither amakeorbuy strategy (the
pseudo-make strategywas excluded). He discovered that notebook
computer makers did not exhibit a strong propensity to pursue a
make strategy when faced with a newly introduced integral PA,
but rather, tended to stay put with their existing buy strategy. Our
findings could provide some hints as to why these firms preferred
the buy strategy over the make strategy.12 One possible conjec-
ture is that firms adopting a pseudo-make strategy, categorized as
a buy strategy in Hoetker (2006), may not be strongly motivated to
change to a make strategy since with their pseudo-make strategy,
they are able to deal with the new integral PA as well as any firm
12 We are fully aware of how risky it is to interpret another scholar’s results with
our current findings. Our conjectures are, thus, aptly stated.
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adopting a make strategy.13 Therefore, given the theoretical and
managerial implications, the results given in our study suggest the
necessity for more careful theoretical and empirical investigation
of the impact of linkages between PAs and firm sourcing decisions
on product performance.
Thefindings of this studyalsoprovide somevaluablemanagerial
implications regarding the firm outsourcing decision. Sometimes
firms find themselves in situations where control of all relevant
components via a make strategy may be difficult or nigh impos-
sible. Once an industry has adopted a standardized PA, a firm’s
capability to quickly customize andprovide better product features
to customers becomes key to maintaining sustainable advantages
(Christensen et al., 2002). Therefore, independent component firms
can thrive in the market and enjoy more economies of scale than
vertically integrated firms in the context of a standardizedmodular
PA (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Baldwin and Clark, 2000).
When the dominant PA for the drive train component set in the
bicycle industry was modular, firms with a buy strategy seemed to
enjoy such advantages. However, as the findings in this study indi-
cate, when faced with innovations associated with integral PAs,
firms need to be cautious with their choice of buy strategy as it
can lead to a more complicated operating environment concern-
ing vital knowledge sharing and integration issues. This integrated
architecture paradigm is likely to give product performance advan-
tages to firms favoring a pseudo-make strategy over firms in a pure
outsourcing scenario. With a pseudo-make strategy, firms in the
bicycle industry could enjoy knowledge management and organi-
zational process advantages that allowed for a higher performing
index shifting system than firmswith a pure buy strategy. By being
in an outsourcing situation in the first place, firms with a buy
strategy found themselves in situationswhere theymight confront
knowledge integration and supplier opportunism problems. They
also had to expend the time and energy to properly integrate their
processeswith those of their suppliers. It may be, therefore, critical
that practicingmanagers have a clear understanding of the linkages
between components and keep design knowledge in-house even in
the face of a required outsourcing decision.
6. Limitations and future research
Regarding limitations and suggestions for future research, the
most obvious is that this study focuses on a single industry, mak-
ing generalizations across different industries challenging. In some
industries, however, suchas thediskdrive (Christensenetal., 2002),
PC (Fine, 1998), andwatch (Jacobides andWinter, 2005) industries,
PAs are evolving towards integrated structures. Investigating these
industriesalongsimilar linesof studymightprove tobemeaningful.
Second, this study focuses on the impact of a firm’s strategic
M/PM/B decision on product performance. It does not, however,
focus on a firm’s strategic decision in the face of an integral PA.
When considering the evolution of PA from modular to integral
form, a firm’s behavior regarding the M/PM/B decision may be
a research topic worthy of pursuit. One meaningful question is,
“Why do some firms move to adopt a make strategy, and why
do others stay put with their current buy strategy?” If the change
of PA is the only factor affecting a firm’s outsourcing strategy,
similarities in firm behavior should be observed whenever a PA
changes from modular to integral form. However, in such situa-
13 Of course, there may be other reasons as to why firms do not pursue a make
strategy when dealing with an integral PA. For example, firms that stay entrenched
with a buy strategy in the face of an integral PA may not realize the importance of
the appropriate alignment for certain types of product architectures and may end
up being stuck in organizational inertia (e.g. Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Nelson
and Winter, 1982).
tions, firms often showheterogeneousmake-buy choices (Hoetker,
2005, 2006). Many factors could come into affect here. For exam-
ple, performance feedback could affect a firm’s strategic behavior.
As this study has shown, firmswith a pseudo-make strategy exhib-
ited similar product performance to firms with a make strategy.
Thus, many firms may not feel a strong compulsion to change
their outsourcing practice. However, if the product performance of
those firms following a pseudo-make strategy was sub-par, firms
couldhavebehavedquite differently. In essence, combining afirm’s
performance-aspiration feedbackmodelwith its strategic behavior
would be an interesting research investigation. Another example
involves the relationship between a firm and its outsourcing part-
ner. If a firm and particular partner have built up a long term
committedworking relationship, theymight build upmutual trusts
which result in better product performance. Thus, looking into the
impact of the relationship between a firm and its supplier partner
with regards tofirmbehavior and its implication forproductperfor-
mancewould also beworthwhile. Lastly, this study finds that in the
bicycle industry, firmswithamakeorpseudo-make strategy clearly
show better product performance than firms possessing alterna-
tive governance modes in dealing with index shifting technology.
This study attempts to shed some light on which strategies firms
should pursue in dealing with integral PAs from the perspective of
knowledge sharing, transfer, and integration, but does not provide
clear reasons as to why firms adopting a make or pseudo-make
strategy are better than firms incorporating purely a buy strategy.
Investigating specific reasons as to why firms adopting a make or
pseudo-make strategy perform better than firms incorporating a
buy strategy, or why firms following a pseudo-make strategy show
similar product performance to firms adopting a make strategy,
would also be valuable. Hence, using in-depth case study analysis
to look at the ‘why’ of this particular issue could provide further
insight into this interesting and important phenomenon.
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